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Introduction
Systems are organized as layers to limit complexity. A common layering principle is the use of levels of abstraction to mark layer boundaries. A computer system is organized in a series of levels of abstraction, each of which defines a "virtual machine" upon which higher levels of abstraction are constructed. Each of the virtual machines presupposes that it is operating in an environment where the abstractions of underlying layers can be treated as axiomatic. When *Arbugh is also with the U S Dep"i?nient of Defense tSmith and Farber's work is supported by DARPA under Contracts #DABT63-95-C-0073, #NM001-96-C-X52, and #MllA972-95-1-0013 with additional support from Hewlett-Packard and Intel Coqwrtions these suppositions are true, tlie system is said to possess integrity. Without integrity, no system can be made secure.
Thus, any system is only as secure as the foundation upon which it is built. For example, a number of attempts were made in the 1960s and 1970s to produce secure computing systems, using a secure operating system environment as a basis [24] . An essential presumption of the security arguments for these designs was that system layers underpinning the operating system, whether hardware, firmware, or both, are trusted. We find it surprising, given the great attention paid to operating system security [ 161 [9] that so little attention has been paid to the underpinnings required for secure operation, e.g., a secure bootstrapping phase for these operating systems.
Without such a secure bootstrap the operating system kernel cannot be trusted since it is invoked by an untrusted process. Designers of trusted systems often avoid this problem by including the boot components in the trusted computing base (TCB) [7] . Tliat is, the bootstrap steps are explicitly trustcd. We believe that this provides a false sense of security to the users of the operating system, and more important, is unnecessary.
AEGIS
We have designed AEGIS, a secure bootstrap process. AEGIS increases the security of tlie boot process by ensuring the integrity of bootstrap code. It does this by constructing a chain of integrity checks, beginning at power-on and continuing until the final transfer of control from the bootstrap components to thc operating system itself. The integrity chccks compare a computed cryptographic hash value with a stored digital signature associated with each component.
Thc AEGIS mhitecture rricludes a recovery mechanism for repairing integrity failures which protects against some classes of denial of service attacks. From the start, AEGIS has been targeted for commercial opcrating systems on commodity hardware, making it a practical "real-world" system.
In AEGIS, the boot process is guarantecd to end up in a secure state, even in the event of integrity failures outside of a minimal section of trusted code. We define a guaranteed secure boot process in two parts. The first is that no code is executed unless it is either explicitly lrusfcd or its integrity is verified prior to its use. The second is that when an integrity failure is detected a process can rccovcr a suitable verified replacement module.
Responses to integrity failure
When a system detects an integrity failurc, onc of three possible courses of action can be takcn.
The first is to continue normally, but issue a wanling. Unfortunately, this may result in the exccution or use of either a corrupt or malicious component.
The second is to not use or execute lhe component. This approach is typically calledfuil secure, and creates a potential denial of service attack. The final approach is to recover and correct the inconsistency from a trusted source before the use or cxecution of the component.
The first two approaches are unacceptable when the systems are important network elements such as switches, intrusion detection monitors, or associated with electronic commerce, since they either make the component unavailable for service, or its results untrustworthy.
Outline of the paper
In Section 2, we make the assumptions of the AEGIS design explicit. Section 3 is the core of the paper, giving an overview of the AEGIS design, and then plunging into details of the IBM PC boot process and its modifications to support AEGIS. A model aid logical dependencies for integrity chaining are given in Scction 4, and a calculation of the complete bootstrap performance is given; the estimated performance is surprisingly good. Section 5 discusses related work and critically examines some alternative approaches to those taken in AEGIS. We discuss the system status and our next steps in Section 6, arid conclude the paper with Section 7.
Assumptions
The first assumption upon which the AEGIS model is based is that the motherboard, processor, and a portion of the system ROM (BIOS) are not compromised, i.e., the adversary is unable or unwilling to replace the motherboard or BIOS. We also depend on the integrity of an expiinsion card which contains copies of the essential components of the boot process for recovery purposes, and optionally a small operating system for recovering components from a trusted network host. We are investigating a more pragmatic approach using thc PROM available on most network cards in lieu of the AEGIS PROM card.
The second assumption is the existence of a cryptographic certificate authority infrastructure to bind an identity with a public key. We are currently planning on using the infrastructure being established by Microsoft and Verisign [27] for use with Authenticode [20] .
The final assumption is that some trusted source exists for recovery purposes. This source may be a host on a network that is reachable through a secure communications protocol, or it may be the trusted ROM card located on the protected host.
AEGIS Architecture

Overview
To have a practical impact, AEGIS must be able to work with commodity hardware with minimal changes (ideally none) to the existing architecture. The IBM PC architecture was selected as our prototype platform because of its large user community and the availability of the source code for several operating systems. We also use the FreeBSD operating system, but the AEGIS architecture is not limited to any specific operating system. Porting to a new operating system only requires a few minor changes to the boot block code so that the kernel can be verified prior to passing control to it. Since the verification code is contained in the BIOS, the changes will not substantially increase the size of the boot loader, or boot block.
AEGIS modifies the boot process shown in figure 2 so that all executable code, except for a very small section of trusted code, is verified prior to execution by using a digital signature. This is accomplished through the addition of an inexpensive PROM board, and modifications to the BIOS. The BIOS and the PROM board contain the verification code, and public key certificates. The PROM board also contains code that allows the secure recovery of any integrity failures found during the initial bootstrap. In essence, the trusted software serves as the root of an authentication chain that extends to the operating system and potentially beyond to application software [22] [lo] [181. A high level depiction of the bootstrap process is shown in figure 1. In the AEGIS boot process, either the operating system kernel is started, or a recovery process is entered to repair any integrity failure detected. Once the repair is completed, the system is restarted to ensure that the system boots. This entire process occurs without user intervention. In addition to ensuring that the system boots in a secure manner, AEGIS can also be used to maintain the hardware and software configuration of a machine. Since AEGIS maintains a copy of the signature for each expansion card, any additional expansion cards will fail the integrity test. Similarly, a new operating system cannot be started since the boot block would change, and the new boot block would fail the integrity test.
AEGIS Boot Process
Every computer with the IBM PC architecture follows approximately the same boot process. We have divided this process into four levels of abstraction (see figure 2) , which correspond to phases of the bootstrap operation. The first phase is the Power on Self Test or POST [21] . POST is invoked in one of four ways:
1. Applying power to the computer automatically invokes POST causing the processor to jump to the e n q point indicated by the processor reset vector.
2. Hardware reset also causes the processor to jump to the entry point indicated by the processor reset vector.
Warm boot (ctrl-all-del under DOS) invokes POST
without testing or initializing the upper 64K of system memory.
4.
Software programs, if permitted by the operating system, can jump to the processor reset vector.
In each of the cases above, a sequence of tests are conducted. All of these tests, except for the initial processor self test, are under the control of the system BIOS. The final step of the POST process calls the BIOS operating system bootstrap interrupt (Int 1911). The bootstrap code first finds a bootable disk by searching the disk search order defined in the CMOS. Once it finds a bootable disk, it loads the primary boot block into memory and passes control to it. The code contained in the boot block proceeds to load the operating system, or a secondary boot block depending on the operating system [ 111 [81 or boot loader [ 11.
Once the BIOS has performed all of its power on tests, it begins searching for expansion card ROMs which are identified in memory by a specific signature. Once a valid ROM signature is found by the BIOS, control is immediately passed to it. When the ROM completes its execution, control is returned to the BIOS.
Ideally, the boot process would proceed in a series of levels with each level passing control to the next until the operating system kernel is running. Unfortunately, the IBM architecture uses a "star like" model which is shown in figure 2.
Operating System 
A Multilevel Boot Process
We have divided the boot process into several levels to simplify and organize the AEGIS BIOS modifications, as shown in figure 3 . Each increasing level adds functionality to the system, providing correspondingly higher levels of abstraction. The lowest level is Level 0. Level 0 contains the small section of trusted software, digital signatures, public key certificates, and recovery code. The integrity of this level is assumed to be valid. We do, however, perform an initial checksum test to identify PROM failures. The first level contains the remainder of the usual BIOS code, and the CMOS. The second level contains all of the expansion cards and their associated ROMs, if any.
The third level contains the operating system boot block(s). These are resident on the bootable device and are responsible for loading the operating system kernel. The fourth level contains the operating system, and the fifth and final level contains user level programs and any network hosts.
The transition between levels in a traditional boot process is accomplished with a jump or a call instruction without any attempt at verifying the integrity of the next level. AEGIS, on the other hand, uses public key cryptography and cryptographic hashes to protect the transition from each lower level to the next higher one, and its recovery process ensures the integrity of the next level in tlie evcnt of failures.
AEGIS BIOS Modifications
AEGIS modifies the boot process shown in figure 2 by dividing the BIOS into two logical sections. The first section contains the bare essentials needed for integrity verification and recovery. Coupled with the AEGIS ROM, it comprises the ''trusted software". The second section contains the remainder of the BIOS and the CMOS.
The first section executes and performs the standard checksum calculation over its address space to protect against ROM failures. Following successful completion of the checksum, the cryptographic hash of the second section is computed and verified against a stored signature. If the signature is valid, control is passed to the second section, i.e., Level 1.
The second section proceeds normally with one change. Prior to executing an expansion ROM, a cryptographic hash is computed and verified against a stored digital signature for the expansion code. If the signature is valid, then control is passed to the expansion ROM. Once the verification of each expansion ROM is complete (Level 2), the BIOS passes control to the operating system bootstrap code. The bootstrap code was previously verified as part of the BIOS, and thus no further verification is required. The bootstrap code finds the bootable device and verifies the boot block.
Assuming that the boot block is verified successfully, control is passed to it (Level 3). If a secondary boot block is required, then it is verified by the prim'uy block before passing control to it. Finally, the kernel is verified by the last boot block in the chain before passing control to it (Level4).
Any integrity failures identified in the above process are recovered either through storage on the expansion ROM card, or through a network host. If the component that fails its integrity check is a portion of the BIOS, then it must be recovered from the ROM card. The recovery process is a simple memory copy from the address space of the ROM card to the memory address of the failed component, in effect shadowing the failed component.
A failure beyond the BIOS causes the system to boot into a recovery kernel contained on tlie ROM card. The recovery kernel contacts a "trusted" host through a secure protocol, e.g., IPv6 [Z] , to recover a verified copy of the failed component. The failed component is then shadowed or repaired, if possible, and the system is restarted.
The resultant AEGIS boot process is shown in figure 3 . Note that when the boot process enters the recovery procedure it becomes isomorphic to a secure network boot. 
Key and Configuration Management
The initial prototype stores the signed cryptographic hashes in a raw format and the public keys in PKCS # I [I31 format. Eventually, we expect to move to X.509~3 certificates [6] and PKCS #7 [ 141 to bind the public key with an identity as well as use the Verisign certificate authority infrastructure. Ideally, we hope in the future that expansion board vendors will include signatures in their ROM in a manner similar to Authenticode [181.
The last two kilobytes of the 128kb AEGIS BIOS flash ROM contain the component signatures and public key(s). We are in the process of developing an installation and configuration program to allow system administrators to install and remove components and their associated signatures stored in the flash ROM. This will provide a level of flexibility to the system and still maintain the security of the system.
Integrity Chaining and System Pecformance
In AEGIS, system integrity is prcservcd through the cliain of integrity checks in the bootstrap process. Tlie ideal authentication chain produced by each lcvcl verifying the next can be represented by the recurrcnce
Ii is a boolean value reprcscnting the intcgrity of level i, and A is the boolean and operation. T/ ; is tlic verification function associated with the i f h lcvcl. 14 takes as its only argument the level to verify, and it returns a boolcan value ils a result. The verification function pefforms a cryptographic hash of the level, and comparcs the result to the value obtained from a stored signature for the level. As stnted earlier, the IBM PC does not lend itself to such a boot process. Instead, we alter the recurrence to:
system, and our level of assurance is prcserved.
L+l =
Here, n represents the numbcr of expansion boards in the
Performance impact on bootstrap completion time
Using the recurrence relation shown in equation 2, we can compute the estimated increase in boot time (TA), without integrity failures, between AEGIS and a standard IBM PC using the following equation: n where t(op) returns the execution time of op. In estimating the time of the verification function, K. we use the BSAFE benchmarks [23] for an Intel 90Mhz Pentium computer, shown in table 1. The cost of verification includes time required for computing a MDS message digest, and the time required to verify the digest against a stored signature. Any signatures embedded in the public key certificate are ignored at the moment.
The BIOS is typically one megabit (128 Kilobytes), and the expansion ROMs are usually 16 kilobytes with some, I RSA Verify (2048bit) i 0.031 sec 
Summing these times givcs TA = 0.1665seconds which is insignificant compared to the length of time currently needed to bootstrap an IBM PC.
Related work
Tlie first presentatiori of a secure boot process was done by Yee [261. In Yee's model, a cryptographic coprocessor is the first to gain control of the system. Unfortunately, this is not possible without a complete architectural revision of most computer systems-even if the coprocessor is tightly coupled. Yee expands his discussion of a secure boot in his thesis [28] , but he continues to state that the secure coprocessor should control the boot process verifying each component prior to its use. Yee states that boot ROM modifications may be required, but since a prototype secure boot process was never implemented more iinplemcntation questions are raised than 'answered by his discussion.
Clark [SI presents a secure boot process for DOS that stores all of the operating system bootstrap code on a PCM-CIA card. He does not address the verification of any firmware (system BIOS or expansion cards). Clark's model, however, does permit mutual cryptographic authentication between the user and the host which is an important capability. However, Ihe use of a PCMCIA card containing all of tlre system boot files creates several configuration management problems, e.g., a system upgrade requires the reprogramming of all the cards in circulation, and since today many users have multiple operating systems on their per-sonal computers a user needs a scparate PCMCIA card for each operating system they wish to use.
Lampson [15] describes a secure boot inodcl as an example for his authentication calculus. In Lampson's model, the entire boot ROM is trusted, and he does not address the verification of expansion cards/ROMs. The Birlix [ 121 Security Architecture proposes a model dcsigned by Michael Gross that is similar to L'ampson's. The Birlix model also suffers from the same problems. In both cases, the boot ROM is responsible for generating a public and private key pair for use in host based authentication once the operating system is running, In AEGIS we leave any security related functions, beyond the boot process, to the operating system without loss of security. To do otherwise limits security choices for the operating systcm.
None of the approaches address a recovery process in the event of an integrity failure.
Discussion and alternative approaches
A possible criticism of this work is that booting from a floppy disk provides the same level of protection. There are several reasons why this is not so. The first is that providing physical security for the floppy disk is extremely difficult. Users can take the disks whercver they like, and do whatever they like to them. One can envision it user building their own boot floppy that gives them systcm level privileges. The user is now free to read and write anywhere on the local disk circumventing any security systems put in place by the "real" boot Hoppy or the on disk operating system. This problem is described by Microsoft [19] as a method of circumventing the Windows NT file system (NTFS). The major shortcoming, however, in using a boot disk is lhat none of the firmware is vcrified prior to use. Thus, a user can add or replace expansion boards into the system without any security controls, potentially introducing unauthorized expansion cards.
Status and Future Work
The AEGIS prototype is nearing completion, and we are confident that a description of its current performance and implementation will be provided at the conference. Initial difficulty in obtaining BIOS source code has delayed modifying it to support AEGIS as dcscribed in the body of the paper. However, we are currently adding the required cryptographic routines and optimizing thein for space to store as much key and recovery material in the flash ROM as possible.
The current recovery kernel prototype uses IPv6 as a means of recovering replacement files. We intend to switch to the Internet Engineering Task Force's (IETF) Internet Security Association and Key Mnnagemcnt Protocol (ISAKMP) [17] to allow user choice of a secure protocol. Additionally, the method with which the recovery kernel contacts a host is currently via a fixed address. We hope to develop or use a protocol in which the recovery host's address can be determined dynamically when needed.
The process by which components are vetted, signed, and the resultant signature and public key certificate installed needs to be addressed carefully since signing a "buggy" or malicious component can result in a security breech. We plan to address this once a full prototype is completed, and will report on the rcsults. As a minimum, we expect to use flaw detection techniques such as those from Bishop [ 3 ] , Kmnan [4] , and others to assist in a technical vetting before the actual signing of the component.
In addition, we are investigating the use of this technology as part of a secure bootstrap for an active network node [25] .
Conclusions
Current operating systems cannot provide security assurances since they are started via an untrusted process. With the explosive growth in Internet commerce, the need for security assurances from computer systems has grown considerably. AEGIS is a gmrunteed secure boot process that ensures that the computer system is started via a trusted process, and ensures that the system starts in spite of integrity failures.
